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This note points to certain similarities of orientation and outcome between Derek 
Parfit’s quest for a theory of beneficence and Amartya Sen’s quest for a suitable real-
valued representation of poverty. It suggests that both projects, in a certain sense, have 
been instructive failures. Using Sen’s own work, the note also suggests a logically 
natural way of dealing with some of the problems in poverty measurement reviewed in 
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1 Introduction 
Amartya Sen and Derek Parfit have made two major contributions to the history of 
ideas—in the form, respectively, of an approach to the measurement of poverty, and the 
quest for a theory of beneficence, or human wellbeing. The present note makes a simple 
point: that there are similarities between the two enterprises which bear remarking. The 
commonalities, it is worth underlining, must not be overdrawn; and there is, in 
particular, no profit to be had in seeking a one-to-one correspondence (which does not 
exist) between the two strands of thought. It is, nevertheless, instructive to discern a 
certain broad identity of concerns shared by the exercises of measuring poverty and 
outlining the requisites of a theory of beneficence. The latter has implications for the 
former which are rather obvious, once they have been identified. The principal excuse 
for the writing of this note is that, to the best of this author’s knowledge, these 
implications have not so far been highlighted. 
 
Parfit’s concerns arose from a consideration of certain problems in population ethics, 
including the one posed by the question: how many people should there ever be? In his 
book Reasons and Persons (hereafter RAP), he says (Parfit 1984: 381): ‘In a complete 
moral theory, we cannot avoid this awesome question’. And an answer, he concluded, 
would depend upon the prospects of discovering ‘Theory X’, which is an acceptable 
theory of beneficence, or wellbeing, as reflected in ‘…the level of happiness, or … the 
quality of life, or … the share per person of resources. We should assume that, in my 
examples, these three correlate, rising and falling together’. An ‘acceptable’ theory of 
beneficence, from a reading of Parfit, would appear to be one which pays due attention 
to the quantity of wellbeing, the quality of wellbeing, and—where there are 
interpersonal differences in attained levels of wellbeing—the extent of inequality in its 
distribution. Thus, on page 405 of RAP, he says, ‘I believe that the best theory about 
beneficence must claim that quality and quantity both have value’; and in subsequent 
discussions, particularly Chapter 19 of RAP, we discern considerable engagement with 
the question of inequality, where the suggestion is that Theory X should be informed by 
the principles of both beneficence and equality. How should Theory X combine 
considerations of quantity, quality and equality? In general, in such a way as not to 
offend our moral intuition, and in particular in such a way as to deliver us from certain 
Embarrassing Conclusions (of which one, in Parfit’s nomenclature, is Repugnant and 
the other Absurd). For the purposes of this note, we do not need to get into the details of 
these conclusions. Simple numerical examples, as we shall see, should suffice to expose 
certain underlying difficulties, as we go along. Nevertheless, it may be useful to have a 
self-contained account of the problem of combining quantity and quality meaningfully 
in a calculus of beneficence—accordingly, a brief treatment of Parfit’s concerns in this 
regard is provided in an Appendix.  
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There are parallels between the search for Theory X and the quest for a solution to the 
aggregation problem in poverty measurement, that is, the search for a ‘satisfactory’ 
measure of poverty with a real-valued representation. The parallels are strikingly 
evident from Sen’s treatment of the problem in his classic Econometrica paper 
‘Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement’, which—discounting Watts’ (1968) 
seminal contribution—is in many ways the first systematic engagement with the 
question, and has since spawned an immense literature on the subject. It is instructive to 
read Sen’s own interpretation of his poverty index (Sen 1976a, 1997: 227-8): 
 
The poverty index proposed here turns out to have quite an easy interpretation. The 
measure [PS = H{I + (1-I)G}] is made up of the headcount ratio H multiplied by the 
income gap ratio I augmented by the Gini coefficient G of the distribution of income 
among the poor weighted by (1-I), that is weighted by the ratio of the mean income of 
the poor to the poverty line income level. One way of understanding its rationale is the 
following: I represents poverty as measured by the proportionate gap between the mean 
income of the poor and the poverty line income. It ignores distribution among the poor, 
and G provides this information. In addition to the poverty gap of the mean income of 
the poor reflected in I, there is the ‘gap’ arising from the unequal distribution of the 
mean income, which is reflected by the Gini coefficient G of that distribution multiplied 
by the mean income ratio. The income-gap measure thus augmented to take note of 
inequality among the poor, that is I + (1-I)G, is normalized per poor person, and does 
not take note of the number of people below the poverty line, which could be minute or 
large. Multiplying [I + (1-I)G] by the headcount ratio H now produces the composite 
measure [PS]. 
 
Poverty is about ‘illbeing’ (maleficence?), and is measured in the space of incomes, but 
setting aside these superficial contrasts, a glance at the index PS suggests a strong 
congruence of concerns between Sen and Parfit. HI may be taken to represent a measure 
of the quantity of deprivation, I a measure of its quality, and G a measure of inequality 
in its interpersonal distribution. The ingredients are the same as those of Theory X; and 
the various extensions, refinements, and modifications of the Sen index of poverty are 
essentially variations on this theme. 
 
If there are commonalities in the motivations underlying the Sen and Parfit 
programmes, what can one say of their respective outcomes? Similarities in motivation 
are, at best, an interesting curiosum; but similarities in outcome have rather more 
substantive implications. Parfit’s pursuit of Theory X ended, by his own admission, in 
failure: as he says (Parfit 1984: 443), ‘[t]hough I failed to find such a theory, I believe 
that, if they tried, others could succeed’. Is the outcome of the poverty aggregation 
programme, such as it has evolved, a success? I shall argue, with the help of very 
elementary examples, against this notion; and in particular that the commonalities in 
orientation between the Sen and the Parfit programmes have carried over to their 
respective outcomes. At the same time, I shall also suggest that Sen’s own work on a   3
distributionally sensitive measure of ‘real national income’ may plausibly be exploited 
in the cause of measuring poverty in a more satisfactory way than has hitherto been 
obtained. Unfortunately, a slightly deeper scrutiny of this mode of resolution suggests—
thanks again, as it happens, to Sen’s own insights—that the problem continues to 
remain substantially unsolved.  
2  Some well-known indices of poverty 
Let Xn be the set of all non-decreasingly ordered non-negative n-vectors of income x = 
(x1,...,xi,…,xn), where xi is the income of the ith poorest person in a community of n 
individuals, and 0 ≤ xi ≤ xi+1, for all i = 1,…,n-1. Let N be the set of positive integers, 
and X the set ∪n∈NXn. Let R be the real line, and S the positive real line. z (> 0) will be 
taken to represent the poverty line; and given a set N of n persons confronted by an 
income vector x, the set Q of poor persons is defined by Q(x;z) ≡ {i∈N⎢xi < z}. The 
cardinality of Q will be denoted by q. A poverty index is a mapping P:XxS → R such 
that, for every (x;z) in its domain, P specifies a unique real number which measures the 
extent of poverty associated with (x;z). Throughout, we shall take it that n is given and 
fixed (so that all our poverty comparisons will be ‘fixed population’ poverty 
comparisons). 
 
Here are some well-known poverty indices—defined for all (x;z)∈XxS—which have 
been suggested in the literature. 
 
The headcount ratio (H). The headcount ratio is the proportion of poor people in the 
population: 
 
H(x;z) = q(x;z)/n(x). 
 
The income gap ratio (I). Let μ
P be the average income of the poor: μ
P(x;z)  ≡ 
[1/q(x;z)]Σi∈Q(x;z)xi. Then, the income gap ratio I is defined as the proportionate shortfall 
of the average income of the poor from the poverty line: 
 
I(x;z) = 1 - μ
P(x;z)/z. 
 
The per capita income gap ratio (R). R is the aggregate income deficit of the poor, 
expressed as a proportion of the total income that would be needed to raise them to the 
poverty line, and is given by the product of H and I:  
 
R(x;z) = H(x;z).I(x;z). 
 
Sen’s Index of Poverty (PS). Sen’s poverty index (see Sen 1976a) is given by the 
expression: 
   4
PS(x;z) = [2/{q(x;z)+1}z]Σi∈Q(x;z)(z-xi)(q(x;z)+1-i). 
 
For ‘large’ values of q, we can write the Sen index, in an asymptotic approximation, as 
 
PS(x;z) = H(x;z)[I(x;z) + {1- I(x;z)}.G(x;z)], 
 
where G [ ≡ 1 + 1/q –(2/q
2μ
P)Σi∈Qxi(q+1-i)] is the Gini coefficient of inequality in the 
distribution of poor incomes. 
 
It may be noted that H violates the monotonicity axiom, which is the requirement that, 
other things equal, a diminution in a poor person’s income should cause measured 
poverty to rise; I and R satisfy the monotonicity axiom but violate the weak transfer 
axiom, which is the requirement that, other things equal, a transfer of income from a 
poor person to a richer poor person which keeps the latter poor should cause poverty to 
rise; and the Sen index satisfies both the monotonicity and the weak transfer axioms. 
 
The Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (or FGT) Pα family of indices. Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) proposed an entire class of poverty indices, parametrized by the 
quantity α (which is to be interpreted as a measure of ‘poverty aversion’), and given by: 
 
Pα(x;z) = (1/n)Σi∈Q(x;z){(z-xi)/z}
α, α ≥ 0. 
 
Some special cases of Pα are worth noting. P0 is just the headcount ratio H, while P1 is 
the per capita income gap ratio R. P2 resembles the Sen index, but measures income 
inequality among the poor in terms of the squared coefficient of variation, C
2, rather 
than the Gini coefficient G: P2 = H[I
2 + (1-I)
2C
2]. Pα satisfies monotonicity for α > 0, 
and, additionally, transfer for α > 1. For α > 2, Pα satisfies a strengthened version of 
transfer, called ‘transfer sensitivity’, which makes the poverty index more sensitive in a 
specific way to income transfers at the lower than at the upper end of the income 
distribution of the poor. Indeed, as α keeps increasing, Pα becomes more and more 
distributionally sensitive until, in the limit, as α goes to infinity, Pα ranks distributions 
by the maximin criterion; i.e., according to the income level of the poorest individual. 
For all values of α, Pα is decomposable, that is, expressible as a population share-
weighted sum of subgroup poverty levels. The FGT Pα family of poverty indices is 
perhaps the most widely employed set of poverty measures in use. 
3  Poverty indices and moral intuition  
In what follows, I shall present a set of elementary arithmetical examples which suggest 
that specific poverty judgments delivered by each of the poverty measures considered in 
Section 2 can militate against our moral intuition. We shall take the poverty line z to be 
given by z = rupees 100, and n (unless otherwise stated) to be 1 million. 
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First, consider the two n-person distributons x
1 and y
1, given, respectively, by x
1 = 
(99,...,99) and y
1 = (0,…,0). Suppose we measure poverty by the headcount ratio. It is 
easily checked that H(x
1;z) = H(y
1;z) = 1. It is immediate that in terms of both the 
quantity and quality of deprivation, x
1 should be regarded as being better than y
1. The 
headcount ratio militates against this judgment by attending neither to quantity nor 
quality, but concentrating solely on the numbers in poverty: this is the well-known 
consequence of H’s violation of the monotonicity axiom. 
 
Next, suppose as before that n = 1 million. Let the n-vectors x
2 and y
2  be given, 
respectively, by x
2 = (0,99,…,99) and y
2 = (0,…,0). If we measure poverty by Pα→∞, 
then the maximin criterion will come into play; and since the worst off individual in 
both distributions is equally badly off (with an income of 0), we must have: Pα→∞ (x
2;z) 
= Pα→∞ (y
2;z), whereas, in terms of both the quantity and quality of deprivation, one 
would be inclined to judge that x
2 is a better distribution than y
2. As in the previous 
case, the poverty index under consideration ignores quantity and quality alike, 
concentrating, as it does, solely on a comparison of the worst off individual’s fortunes: 
this is the well-known consequence of maximin’s propensity to uphold a sort of 
‘dictatorship of the weakest’. 
 
Now consider the n-dimensional distributions x
3 = (0,100,…,100) and y
3 = (0,…,0). If 
we measure poverty by the income gap ratio, then noting that the average income of the 
poor is 0 in both distributions, one must have: I(x
3;z) = I(y
3;z) = 1. It is hard to believe 
that x
3, in which only one person out of a million is subjected to total deprivation, is not 
better than y
3, in which all one million people out of a million are subjected to total 
deprivation. The index I attends only to quality, ignoring quantity altogether. Sen 
(1981: 33) cites as one of the ‘damaging limitations’ of I the fact that it ‘...pays no attention 
whatever to the number or proportion of ... people below the poverty line, concentrating 
only on the aggregate shortfall...’. Indeed, the problem shows up more acutely in the 
following example, where x
3′ = (0,100,…,100) and y
3′ = (0.01,…,0.01): I(x
3′;z) [= 1] > 
I(y
3′;z) [= 0.9999]. This corresponds to Parfit’s (1984: 406) ‘Two Hells’ example: 
 
The Two Hells. In Hell One, the last generation consists of ten innocent 
people, who each suffer great agony for fifty years. The lives of these 
people are much worse than nothing. They would all kill themselves if 
they could. In Hell Two, the last generation consists not of ten but of ten 
million innocent people, who each suffer agony just as great for fifty 
years minus a day. 
 
With an appropriate change of circumstantial detail, x
3′ and y
3′can be seen to correspond 
to Hell 1 and Hell 2 respectively. In certifying x
3′ to be poverty-wise worse than y
3′, the 
index I is relying solely on what Parfit calls the ‘Average Principle’; but, as he observes 
(1984: 406) ‘When we consider these imagined Hells, we cannot plausibly appeal only 
to the … Average View’.    6
 
Perhaps the per capita income gap ratio R ( ≡ HI) will fare better? Let x
4 and y
4 be two 
one-million-vectors, with x
4 = (99.9999,…,99.9999) and y
4 = (0,100,…,100). Note that 
in neither case is there any inequality in the distribution of poor incomes, whence the 
Sen index of poverty, in these cases, will coincide with the per capita income gap ratio. 





-6. The judgment 
delivered by R and PS is scarcely convincing. Note that y
4 can be derived from x
4 by 
depriving person 1 of his entire income and distributing it equally among the remaining 
999,999 individuals, so that each of these individuals is better off to the extent of rupees 
0.0001. The tradeoff, rightly, appears to be absurd. What is at work is what Parfit calls 
the ‘Total Principle’—the concern is entirely with quantity, and not at all with quality. 
And it is precisely this sort of obsession with total quantity which leads to Parfit’s 
criticism of classical utilitarianism, in terms of its precipitating his Repugnant 
Conclusion. A poverty version of the Repugnant Conclusion would sound, loosely, 
something like the following: ‘One must be poverty-wise morally indifferent between 
two situations, in one of which a very large number of people experience relatively low 
levels of deprivation (with incomes close to the poverty line), and in the other, a single 
person is made to bear the brunt of complete destitution—just as long as the total 
quantity of deprivation in the two situations is the same’.  
 
The Pα indices, for finite values of α, fare no better. Take any positive, finite value of α, 
and suppose n = 10




5  = (90,…,90) and  y
5  = (0,100,…,100). The common 
tendency would be to judge x
5 to be a poverty-wise better distribution than y
5. But 
again, because of a complete commitment to quantity at the expense of quality, Pα will 
force indifference between the two distributions: it is easily verified that Pα(x
5;z) = 
Pα(y
5;z) = 1/n. 
 











has been shown that each of the poverty measures H, I, R, PS, Pα(finite), and Pα→∞ can 
precipitate poverty comparisons which go against our moral intuition, and also against 
our considered judgment on the value of both quantity and quality in an overall 
appraisal of poverty. These indices, in specific instances, ignore both quantity and 
quality, or stress quality at the expense of quantity, or quantity at the expense of quality. 
The problem, as has been noted by Subramanian (1989: 245), is that ‘… a unique real 
number imposes an artificial moral equivalence among various outcomes with vastly 
differing ethical implications’. While other poverty indices proposed in the literature 
could be considered, or a more general statement of the problem could be essayed, there 
is enough on board, I believe, to suggest that there are difficulties with poverty 
aggregation which are deep, and endemic to the considerations which have 
conventionally inspired it. It would appear that the programme of poverty measurement, 
as it has evolved over time, and the programme of constructing a satisfactory theory of 
beneficence, have intersecting areas of both ambition and failure.   7
4 A  way  out? 
What we have considered so far in this note is only the aggregation exercise in poverty 
measurement, having implicitly assumed that the identification problem—that of fixing 
the poverty line z—has been satisfactorily solved. In point of fact, though, the latter 
problem is an enormously difficult one to solve. Should the poverty line be seen as an 
absolute one or a relative one? What exactly does one mean by ‘relative’? Should z be 
determined through a ‘basic needs’ approach? What are these basic needs, which 
commodities satisfy them, how much of each of these commodities is the ‘right’ 
amount? Should the poverty line be fixed with respect to nutritional requirements? 
Which nutrients, in what quantities, and with what allowance, if any, for intra- and 
inter-individual variations in requirements? And so on, and on. In dealing with these 
questions, one has the luxury of neither a reasonable absence of ambiguity at the 
conceptual level, nor a reasonable presence of consensual agreement on the ground. 
 
At the level of logic, a possible way out of the aggregation problem considered earlier, is 
one which could also, and at the same time, address the identification problem. This 
constructive suggestion is offered here in a spirit of considerable tentativeness—for 
reasons which will be amplified in the following section. It entails no more than a direct 
application of Sen’s (1976b) distributionally adjusted welfare measure to the poverty 
problem, along the following lines. Letting D stand for a measure of inequality in the 
distribution of poor incomes, the aggregation problem, it may be recalled, centers around 
identifying a ‘satisfactory’ way in which H, I and D can be combined. Where there is no 
inequality, the problem is one of finding a satisfactory way in which H and I can be 
combined. A widely accepted recourse has been to the multiplicative form HI, which 
corresponds to the ‘quantity’ component of deprivation (while I corresponds to its ‘quality’ 
component). For a fixed population, both H and I can vary, and it is variations in both 
which causes the problem. Logically, therefore, a natural way out which suggests itself is 
to get rid of either H or I, so that one is left to deal with only one dimension of poverty. 
Arising from this, one is tempted to ask: what if one simply fixed H once and for all, at say 
50 per cent? Then, effectively, one only has to worry about the ‘quality’ component of 
deprivation (and, where there is inequality in the distribution of deprivation, about such 
inequality). For all practical purposes, then, the identification problem has also been 
solved: the poverty line z is simply the median income, call it M. Let μ
M be the average 
income of the ‘poor’, now interpreted simply as the poorest 50 per cent of any population; 
and let G
M be the Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribution of incomes among the 
poorest 50 per cent of the population. Sen’s distributionally adjusted welfare measure, 
restricted to the poor, is the quantity μ
M(1- G
M). The negative of this, namely μ
M(G
M-1), it 
is being suggested here, be used as an index of ‘illfare of the poor’, or simply—if it does 
not entail too much of an abuse of language—as a poverty index, call it Π. Π, it can be 
checked, will lie in the interval (-∞,0]. 
 
It may be objected that the poor are always going to be with us according to the 
proposed measure. While this is true, it may also be held that this should not cause too   8
much concern, so long as our purpose in measuring poverty is inspired only by the need 
to effect poverty comparisons. Additionally, if one treats it as a convention to view the 
poorest 50 per cent of any population as ‘the poor’, one does not have to any longer 
contend with the identification problem. Moreover, the index Π does not lend itself to 
any of the odd poverty judgments that were reviewed in Section 3 with respect to the 










5). And finally, the index Π 
is closely related to the Sen index of poverty PS—an unsurprising fact, considering that 
both indices were created by the same person. It is easily verified that when q is ‘large’, 
the Sen poverty index can be written as  
 
PS = H – H(μ
P/z)(1-G). 
 
If we take z to be the median income M, then H becomes 50 per cent for all populations 
under comparison, and since it is a constant across the board, it can be eliminated from 
further consideration; μ
P becomes μ
M, and G becomes G
M; and by removing z from the 
picture, we avoid normalizing with respect to the poverty line. What effectively remains is 
μ
M(G
M-1), or Π.  
 
Briefly, Π would seem to have a number of advantages vis-à-vis many poverty indices in 
current use, and it also has the merit of simplicity. Does this extricate one from the nihilism 
of Section 3? Unfortunately not, as the discussion in Section 5 reveals. 
5  Not a way out! 
While the ‘resolution’ suggested above may have some surface appeal from a logical 
point of view, it falls foul of persuasiveness when judged by a simple sociological 
criterion, namely the view, as Sen (1983, 1985: 332) has convincingly argued, that 
‘[t]here is … an irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty’. Specifically, it could 
be objected that calling the poorest 50 per cent of any population ‘the poor’ amounts to 
Humpty-Dumptyism (‘When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less’). It could be objected, in particular, that the poorest 50 per cent in 
one population could include in their lot some, or many, who are leading lives well 
beyond what would be dictated by their ‘basic needs’; and that the poorest 50 per cent 
in another population could exclude from their lot some, or many, who are leading lives 
well within what would be dictated by their ‘basic needs’. This must be regarded as a 
significant criticism. A simple numerical example should help to highlight the import of 
the difficulty. Let us suppose that it is possible, in some ‘rough’ yet meaningful way, to 
suggest that a person with income less than some z* is ‘absolutely impoverished’: 
whether or not a person is in absolute poverty is frequently a matter of practical 
knowledge, irrespective of the difficulty of stipulating a cut-off level of income with 
any precision. Now consider two equidimensional income vectors x and y, and an 
income level x < z*, such that, in vector x, every person has an income of x while in 
vector y, half of the population have an income of x and the other half an income of z*.   9
Our normative instinct would dictate that x is poverty-wise worse than y, since 100 per 
cent of the population in x are ‘absolutely impoverished’, while this is true for only 50 
per cent of the population in y: other things equal, the numbers in absolute poverty do 
matter. Yet, and as can be immediately seen, the index Π will force indifference 
between the distributions x and y: Π(x) = Π(y) = (-)x. 
 
The embarrassment to one’s intuition can be even more acute. Imagine two one-million-
vectors x and y, such that in x, every person has an income of 1,000 rupees, while in y, 
the poorest fourth have an income of zero each and the richest three-fourths have an 
income of a million rupees each. Assume that z* can be pitched in the region of rupees 
100. Then, clearly, Π(x) = (-)1,000; and, noting that μ
M(y) = 500,000 and G
M(y) = 0.5, 
it must be the case that Π(y) = (-)250,000. Briefly, the index Π suggests that there is 
vastly less poverty in y than in x, even though, from any reasonably absolutist 
perspective on poverty, there is no (absolutely) poor person in x, while there are a 
quarter of a million completely impoverished individuals in y! 
 
In short, if one concedes that ‘there is … an irreducible absolutist core in the idea of 
poverty’ (and it is hard to see how one can fail to do so), then the way out explored in 
Section 4 is really no way out at all. We are now enabled to see how the identification 
and the aggregation exercises—which are often treated as independent problems in the 
measurement of poverty—are actually deeply intertwined. If we were free to divorce the 
identification of the poverty line from any ‘absolutist’ considerations, then a measure 
like Π might be a reasonably satisfactory way of addressing the aggregation problem. 
But, since we do not have this freedom, we are forced back into the aggregational 
entanglements reviewed in Section 3.  
6 Concluding  observations 
This note has pointed to certain correspondences between the project of poverty 
measurement as initiated by Amartya Sen, and the project of coming up with a 
satisfactory theory of beneficence, designed to address questions in population ethics, as 
initiated by Derek Parfit. Similarities of motivation, content, and outcome have been 
noted; and while both projects, it could be argued, have met with a failure of sorts, the 
failure has also been instructive with respect to the complexities that must be 
encountered and dealt with in the kinds of projects under review. At a more constructive 
level, this note has also proposed a possible way out of the poverty measurement 
problems reviewed in it, by, as it happens, pressing Amartya Sen’s own work on ‘real 
national income’—done more or less concurrently with his early work on poverty 
measurement—to the rescue. However, closer scrutiny of this approach has also pointed 
in the direction of failure.  
 
Poverty statistics are a key pointer to how well or badly an economy is faring. 
Description, evaluation, and policy intervention require that both the identification and   10
the aggregation exercises be addressed with care. Both magnitudes and directions of 
change/difference in poverty levels are highly sensitive to how the poverty line is fixed 
and what index is used to measure poverty. Reddy and Pogge (2003) show that 
international comparisons of poverty, as well as assessments of global trends in poverty, 
are only as good as the care with which the conceptual underpinnings of poverty 
measurement are addressed. Subramanian (2005) is a similar comment on the validity of 
India’s official time-series poverty statistics. The present note suggests that the problem 
is further compounded by conceptual ambiguities at the very heart of poverty 
measurement. At the risk of pronouncing a prescriptive banality, it must be concluded 
that poverty is too important a subject for the analyst to measure it without care, or to 
interpret her findings without a self-conscious awareness of the logical problems 
inherent in its measurement.  
   11
Appendix 
Some difficulties of combining the quantity and quality of wellbeing in addressing 
questions in population ethics: a brief exposition  
Parfit (1984) points to two principles, which he calls, respectively, the Total Principle 
and the Average Principle, which could be summoned in addressing questions relating 
to the comparison of wellbeing in alternative population scenarios. The Total Principle 
is concerned only with the quantity of wellbeing, while the Average Principle is 
concerned only with its quality. Neither by itself is a satisfactory guide to wellbeing 
comparisons; furthermore, problems arise when we attempt to combine the two in a 
theory of beneficence. The nature of these difficulties is briefly explicated in what 
follows. 
 
We consider the Total Principle first, and draw on Dasgupta (1993) for the ensuing 
discussion. Consider a society with a population of size M in which each person 
experiences a level of welfare w*. Let the aggregate welfare in this society be represented 
by W(w*,M). Consider another possible society, with a population of size M+1, in which 
again each person experiences a welfare level of w*, so that aggregate welfare in this 
society is W(w*,M+1). With Dasgupta (op. cit.), let us consider the class of ethical theories 
which presume the existence of a unique w* such that, for all M ≥ 0, W(w*,M) = 
W(w*,M+1): then, this w* can be calibrated as the zero level of welfare. Utilitarianism, 
which belongs to the class of ethical theories just alluded to, judges the aggregate welfare 
of a society to be given by the sum of individual welfare levels in that society. In line with 
this, for a society of M persons each of whom experiences a positive level of welfare w~, 
utilitarianism will dictate that aggregate welfare of the society is given by W(w~,M) = 
Mw~. Let us add k individuals to this society, and let wk be the welfare level of each 
individual in this enhanced population. The utilitarian social welfare function will now 
pronounce that W(wk,M+k) = (M+k)wk, and will judge the two regimes to be welfare-
equivalent if  W(wk,M+k) = W(w~,M), or, equivalently, if  wk = [M/(M+k)]w~. Notice 
now that as k→ ∞, wk → 0: this is the Repugnant Conclusion—the conclusion, yielded by 
utilitarianism, which supports the ethical unexceptionableness of having indefinitely large 
populations whose members experience arbitrarily small positive levels of welfare. This is 
the consequence of an exclusive concern with the quantity of wellbeing.  
 
Next, we consider the Average Principle. If wi is the welfare level of the ith person in a 
society of M individuals, and if mM ≡ (1/M)Σi=1
Mwi  is the average level of welfare of the 
society, then the Average Principle will certify social welfare to be given by W({wi},M) = 
mM. Consider a two-person society (say, Adam and Eve) each of whom enjoys a high level 
of welfare of w
+; by the Average Principle, W({w
+,w
+},2) = w
+. Consider an M-person 
society, with M >> 2, such that each person in this society (including Adam and Eve) 
enjoys a welfare level of  w




+-ε. The Average Principle asserts that it is 
best that Adam and Eve be the only persons to exist on earth: even a tiny reduction in their 
welfare level will not be seen to be compensated by the vastly larger numbers of people 
that are enabled to enjoy a high level of welfare.  
 
The Total Principle offends our intuition because it upholds quantity at the complete 
expense of quality, and the Average Principle offends our intuition because it upholds 
quality at the complete expense of quantity. Parfit is thus led to suggest that both quantity 
and quality have a rightful place in a theory of beneficence. But combining both also leads 
to difficulties, as demonstrated below. Recall that the Total Principle permits average 
welfare to keep falling (for as long as it is positive) if the population increases by a 
sufficiently large amount to maintain the total quantity of welfare. We may wish to restrict 
the role of quantity by postulating some finite population size M* such that, for all 
populations M less than M*, aggregate welfare is MmM, and for all populations M greater 
than or equal to M*, aggregate welfare is M*mM. In this view, beyond a certain population 
size, the addition of lives with positive welfare ceases to automatically add to moral value. 
This, however, does not apply to lives with negative value, that is, to lives which are ‘bad’ 
or ‘unhappy’—the addition of a ‘bad’ life always increases moral disvalue, without limit. 
Thus, if a proportion g of a population of size M have ‘good’ lives with a welfare level of 
w each, and a proportion 1-g have ‘bad’ lives with an illfare level of d each, then we may 
postulate a formula of aggregate net welfare given by 
 
W(g,w,d,M) = M[gw - (1-g)d] for all M < M*; 
                     = M*gw – M(1-g)d for all M ≥ M*.  
 
Consider three population scenarios A, B and C, where A will be taken to denote the 
present, and B and C are set in the future. Suppose the present population to be M*/2. Then 
the aggregate net welfare level under situation A is given by WA = (M*/2)[gw - (1-g)d]. 
For specificity, set g = 0.9 and d = 5w. Then, making the appropriate substitutions in the 
preceding equation, we have: 
 
(1)WA = 0.2M*w. 
 
In situation B, the future consists of two centuries in each of which the population is M*: 
every other feature of the world is the same as in situation A. It is then easy to see that in 
each of these centuries, the aggregate net welfare is given by WB  = M*[gw - (1-g)d] = 
2WA, whence (in view of (1)), in each of these centuries: 
 
(2) WB  = 0.4M*w. 
 
The future, as represented by situation B, is clearly better than the present, as represented 
by situation A. Finally, situation C will be taken to be identical to situation B, save that in 
situation C the future consists of only one century: the aggregate net welfare level in   13
situation C will then be given by WC = M*gw – 2M*(1-g)w, which, given the assumed 
parameter values, reduces to  
 
(3) WC = - 0.1M*w. 
 
From (3) we notice that aggregate net welfare in situation C is actually negative: it would 
be better if no-one existed in situation C. From (1), (2) and (3), we must conclude that the 
future as represented by B is better than the present, while the future as represented by C is 
worse than the present and, indeed, intrinsically bad. Yet, in all relevant details, the two 
futures are identical—with respect to the size of the total population, and with respect to 
the distribution of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ lives. This conclusion to which we are driven, in an 
attempt to meaningfully combine notions of both quantity and quality in a theory of 
beneficence, is what Parfit calls the ‘Absurd Conclusion’.  
 
To summarize, in isolation or together, we encounter problems of coherence in 
accommodating considerations of quantity and quality in an assessment of human 
wellbeing.    14
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